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Article 5

Comments on Professor Page's Discussion of
Matsushita
T. Mark McLaughlin*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita1 was a decidedly
positive development, both as a substantive antitrust decision and as a
2
sound application of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Like all decisions in the antitrust field, it is part of the common law
development of antitrust principles. Professor Page's remarks illustrate
that the common law continues to evolve as the courts apply Matsushita
to the widely varying fact patterns that come before them.
I have a number of follow-up observations to Professor Page's
productive and insightful observations on the law as it continues to
evolve. These are offered from the perspective of someone who
regularly consults with businesses, often in concentrated industries,
about conducting their affairs in a way that emphasizes that all of their
conduct is unilateral, and who often defends antitrust cases involving
claims of conspiracy.

II.

MATSUSHITA AS A CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE

My first comment relates to the civil procedure component of the
Matsushita decision, and focuses on Matsushita as an emphatic
statement by the Supreme Court that Rule 56 has a significant role to
play in antitrust cases. The fact that such cases often are complicated,
requiring an understanding of an entire industry, an analysis of conduct
that has taken place over many years, and substantial expert testimony,
does not exempt them from the standards of Rule 56.
Indeed, one lesson from Matsushita and the cases that have applied it
is that the unwieldy nature of antitrust cases makes it all the more

* T. Mark McLaughlin is a partner in the Chicago office of Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw LLP,
where he concentrates on the defense of antitrust and class action litigation.
1. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (prescribing the procedure for summary judgment motions).
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important to the orderly administration of justice that courts ensure that
the plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact in support of its
claim before sending the case, with all of its complexity, to a jury. The
district court in the CitricAcid case, which applied Matsushita to grant
summary judgment (in an opinion which the Ninth Circuit affirmed),
phrased the issue in practical terms by noting that the "quantity" of
material that a plaintiff develops in the course of discovery cannot
"quality" of evidence that it must present in order to
substitute for the
3
sustain a claim.
One way to gain some perspective on the civil procedure component
of Matsushita is to view it as one of a series of decisions over the past
twenty years in which the Supreme Court has emphasized the serious
and often-difficult role of the district court as a gatekeeper, making sure
that only meritorious disputes proceed to trial.
Matsushita itself was one of three separate decisions that the Court
issued in 1986 relating to summary judgment. The other two were
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.4 (a libel case) and Celotex Corp v.
Catrett5 (an asbestos case). Together, the three decisions emphasize
that Rule 56 plays a meaningful role in all federal civil litigation, and
that the complexity of a case does not exempt it from the requirements
of Rule 56. The Supreme Court also emphasized the gatekeeper role of
the district court in its decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 6 General Electric Co. v. Joiner,7 and Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael,8 noting the responsibility of the district court to
make sure that proffered expert testimony truly is expert in nature, and
fits the case at hand, before permitting that testimony to be offered at
trial.
Another reminder by the Supreme Court that the district court has
substantial gatekeeper responsibilities was its 2004 decision in
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffinan-LaRoche, Ltd.9 The plaintiffs there were
persons who bought vitamins abroad, seeking to recover damages
(trebled under U.S. antitrust laws) in the form of overcharges resulting
from a price-fixing conspiracy. The Supreme Court held that under the

3. In re Citric Acid Litig., 996 F. Supp. 951, 956 (N.D. Cal. 1998), affid, 191 F.3d 1090 (9th
Cir. 1999).
4. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
5. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
8. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
9. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
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Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,10 plaintiffs who suffer an
injury abroad, independent of any injury suffered domestically, may not
sue under the federal antitrust laws. In the many recent cases under that
Act, the courts have emphasized that the district court must determine
whether the plaintiff has suffered the requisite domestic injury as a
preliminary matter of subject matter jurisdiction, before the plaintiff
may proceed with its claim.
In each of these areas, the district court has the often-difficult role of
serving as a gatekeeper. I believe that the decisions in these areas have
been very positive events, promoting the principled development of the
law.

III.

MATSUSHITA AS AN ANTITRUST CASE

Although Matsushita has a civil procedure component, and fits
comfortably in the flow of Supreme Court cases relating to the
administration of complex cases of all types, at its core it is an antitrust
case, because substantive antitrust law, and not any feature of Rule 56,
provided the basis for the decision. That is, section 1 of the Sherman
Act1 1 prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
unreasonable restraint of trade. It does not prohibit unilateral conduct.
In section 1 cases, as in all civil cases, the test on summary judgment is
whether the plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact in
support of its claims. The range of issues that are genuine and material
will depend entirely on the elements of the claim that plaintiff must
prove. The Matsushita test is an application of Rule 56, tailored to the
elements of a section 1 claim, to allow the district court to determine, in
fulfilling its responsibility under Rule 56, whether the evidence would
permit a reasonable jury to find that there had been a conspiracy.
Contrary to some suggestions, I do not believe that Matsushita and
the cases that have applied it over the last twenty years can be construed
as creating a "special rule" that somehow unduly favors defendants in
conspiracy cases.
IV. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING MATSUSHITA
Notwithstanding the solid substantive basis for Matsushita and its
soundness as a reminder that even big cases are subject to the
requirements of Rule 56, history has shown that the Matsushita test is
often difficult to apply.

10. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2006).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
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The test is worded broadly, first of all. The search that the district
court must undertake in each case is for evidence that "tends to exclude
the possibility" of unilateral action. That test needs to be applied to the
mountains of evidence that the parties necessarily develop in antitrust
cases, and to the inferences that the parties seek to draw from that
mountain of facts and from the always-complicated economic evidence
regarding industry structure and performance. As applied in any
particular case, the test can seem like an abstraction, and one that may
lead a district court to wonder at what point along an apparent spectrum
the evidence "tends to exclude" the possibility that the defendants acted
unilaterally.
That is why Professor Page's focus on the issue of communications
among the alleged conspirators is appropriate. In cases involving
application of the Matsushita standard, I have found it helpful to
provide a reminder to the court of the basic definition of conspiracy
from prior cases-that is, the need for plaintiff to show that the alleged
conspirators engaged in a "conscious commitment to a common scheme
designed to achieve an unlawful objective." 12 Reference to that
standard helps to make the inquiry more concrete and helps focus the
attention of the court on the need for the plaintiff to demonstrate the
who/what/when/where/how of an alleged conspiracy, and on questions
like when the supposed conspiracy began, who started it, and what is
the proof that each alleged member joined the conspiracy and thereby
made the required "conscious commitment to a common scheme" with
the other alleged participants. Those are the kinds of basic questions
that keep the inquiry focused, concrete, and tailored to the facts of the
particular case. As Professor Page notes, that inquiry will require proof
of communication among the participants in the alleged concerted
course of conduct.
I believe that it is worth noting, though, that Professor Page's
observation that it would promote clarity and consistency in the
treatment of summary judgment motions on section 1 cases for the
courts to hold plaintiffs to the burden of coming forward with evidence
of communications among the alleged conspirators (or evidence that
makes sense only in the context of a conspiracy, such that an inference
that communications reflecting an agreement took place is reasonable)
is a helpful reminder of the law as it already exists, and not a call for
adoption of a new legal standard.

12. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Co., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (quoting Edward J.
Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
911 (1981).
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The plaintiffs burden in a section 1 case is, as it always has been, to
show a contract, combination, or conspiracy, as "[t]he existence of an
agreement is '[t]he very essence of a section 1 claim."' 13 As the ABA
Civil Antitrust Jury Instructions emphasize, a section 1 claim requires
proof of "an agreement by two or more persons to accomplish some
unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful
means." 14 They go on to state that for a conspiracy to be present "two
or more persons must enter into an agreement that they will act
together," that "the alleged members of the conspiracy in some way
came to an agreement to accomplish a common purpose," or (stated
another way) "that the parties knowingly worked together to accomplish
15
a common purpose."
By emphasizing the need for an agreement in a section 1 case, the
ABA Model Instructions, in my view, reinforce the necessity for proof
of communication to reach the prohibited agreement. To be sure, the
Model Instructions, and the cases, reflect that the communications that
demonstrate the existence of an agreement can take many forms. But
the key point here is that section 1 cases demand proof of an agreement,
and agreements necessarily come into place following communications.
As a result, focusing on the evidence of communications among the
alleged conspirators is a helpful and necessary aspect of judicial inquiry
at the summary judgment stage under existing law.
V. THE FUTURE
So much for the past and present. My last point addresses the future.
As Professor Waller mentioned in his introduction, a prominent event
Court's decision in the Twombly
on the horizon will be the Supreme
16
term.
this
hear
will
it
that
case
The issue in Twombly is the level of detail required under Rule 817 to
plead an antitrust conspiracy. The district court in that case (Judge
Lynch in New York City) dismissed a complaint in which the plaintiff
alleged a conspiracy by incumbent local telephone companies (the Baby
Bells) to thwart emerging competition. The complaint noted that none
13. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Alvord-Polk,
Inc. v. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 999 (3d Cir. 1994)).
14.

ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST

CASES B-2 (2005).

15.

Id.

16. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd, 425 F. 3d

99 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 2965 (2006) (note that my firm is involved in the
case, for one of the defendants).
17.

FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
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of the Baby Bells had licensed emerging competing local exchange
carriers to use the incumbent's network elements (as mandated by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996), and that none of the Baby Bells had
moved into a neighboring incumbent's area. In addition to that
allegation of parallel conduct by the Baby Bells, the complaint alleged,
without any supporting factual detail, that they had conspired against
the emerging local exchange carriers.
Judge Lynch dismissed that complaint, and noted that it contained no
allegation of "plus factors" that would show that the parallel conduct of
the incumbents was the fruit of conspiracy rather than unilateral
conduct. The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal and found that a
plaintiff need not allege "plus factors" in order to state a claim. Rather,
according to the Second Circuit, the plaintiff simply needed to outline
the alleged conspiracy and conclude that one existed. As long as
conspiracy was one of the possible explanations for the alleged parallel
conduct, the court held that the complaint would survive a motion to
dismiss, and the case would proceed to discovery. The Second Circuit
emphasized that once the case proceeded past the motion to dismiss
stage, in order to create a genuine issue of material fact in support of its
claim and to avoid summary judgment under Matsushita, the plaintiff
would need to develop "plus factor" evidence that "tended to exclude
the possibility of unilateral conduct." However, according to the
Second Circuit in Twombly, pleading under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
did not require an allegation of the plus factors in the first instance.
In June of 2006 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Twombly. In
addition to the briefs by the parties, there were several amicus briefs
filed in the matter by the Solicitor General, the ABA, several states, the
Chamber of Commerce, and twenty-four renowned economists. All of
those briefs are very thought-provoking for people in our line of work.
Consistent with my role here to provide the defendant's perspective, let
me leave you with the thought that the briefs submitted by and in
support of the defendants lay out a straightforward and well-supported
case for the proposition that Rule 8, while not requiring the plaintiff to
plead all of its evidence, does require a plaintiff to allege enough facts
to show that, if it proves them, it will be entitled to relief. That is,
because section 1 of the Sherman Act requires the plaintiff to prove
conspiracy-and, when the evidence is ambiguous, requires the plaintiff
to come forward, under Matsushita, with evidence that "'tends to
exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted
independently"-Rule 8 should require a plaintiff to allege enough

2007]

Comments on Professor Page's Discussion

facts, in the words of Rule 8, to "show[] that the pleader is entitled to
18
relief."
Others, of course, may have a different perspective on Twombly. We
are all likely to agree, though, that whatever the Supreme Court does,
we are very likely to see plenty of citations to Matsushitain its opinion.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this discussion.

18.

FED. R. CIV. P. 8.

